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Abstract
This paper studies equilibrium incentive contracts in a Cournot
duopoly, in which institutional arrangements constrain rms to pay
(risk-neutral) workers a given salary. In this context, performance-
related-pay (PRP) and relative performance evaluation (RPE) are
compared in terms of resulting levels of workers' eort (rms' expected
output), market price, prots, consumer surplus and social welfare. It
is shown that, while under principal-agent standard assumptions (i.e.
all wage components are \freely" negotiated by each rm-worker pair)
PRP and RPE are equivalent, in the presence of institutional \fric-
tions", RPE outperforms PRP in relation to output, prots, consumer
surplus and social welfare. Moreover, RPE also permits to replicate
results obtained without institutional constraints, even if the mecha-
nism driving nal outcomes is very dierent.
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evaluation, institutional constraints; JEL Codes: J33, J41, L13
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11 Introduction
Despite the widespread existence in labour markets of collective bargaining
practices and cogent legislations with regard to minimum wages, a standard
assumption that characterizes the principal-agent model is that each single
principal/agent pair is free to negotiate, without any institutional constraint,
each single pay component. In such a context, a well known result states that,
when agents are risk-neutral, optimal incentive contracts based on relative
performance evaluation cannot outperform optimal contracts simply based
on the (absolute) performance of each single agent.1
In a setting with two principal-agent relationships, in which rms (prin-
cipals) compete  a la Cournot in the product market and risk-neutral workers
(agents) supply costly eort that aects their rms' output, this paper com-
pares simple (linear) forms of standard performance-related-pay, in which
the incentive pay for the agent only depends on his/her performance, and
relative performance evaluation, in which incentives are linked to a compar-
ison between the agent's performance with that of the \competitor". In this
context, due to imperfect product market competition, each agent's incentive
contract in
uences, further than his/her eort choice, also that of the rival
rm's agent, with relevant eects on the outcomes of the market as a whole.
We also introduce institutional considerations into the analysis. In par-
ticular, to do this in the most simple fashion, we consider the salary, that is,
the constant (with respect to output) term of workers' total pay, as given (i.e.
not contractible by each single principal/agent pair) and the same for both
1By contrast, when agents are risk-adverse, agency theory (see, in particular, Holm-
str om (1982) and Mookherjee (1984)) has provided a rationale for the relative performance
evaluation in terms of its informational content. In particular, when agents outcomes are
subject to a common element of uncertainty, the output of each individual acts both as a
signal of his own performance and as a signal of the realizations of the common uncertain
parameter. Thus comparisons of agents performances are valuable because they bring
additional pieces of information and act as a lter for the common shock.
2rms. This is consistent with an institutional setting, commonly observed in
many countries' industrial relations arrangements (e.g. Layard and Nickell,
1999; OECD, 1999; Nicoletti et al., 2001), in which collective bargaining over
salary takes place at an upper (nation-wide or multi-employer) level between
peak associations (e.g. trade unions) and act as binding minima for all work-
ers in the relevant sector.2 At the same time, some decentralization in wage
setting exists in relation to incentive schemes, which are negotiated at the
local (i.e. rm's) level.
In this context, our results can be summarized as follows. First, if par-
ties \freely" negotiate all wage components, including the salary,3 relative
performance evaluation and performance-related-pay are equivalent, that is,
(in accordance with the standard principal-agent literature) they produce
the same results. Instead, when institutional \frictions" are introduced into
the analysis, even if workers are risk neutral, relative performance evaluation
outperforms performance-related-pay as regards total prots, consumer sur-
plus and, most notably, social welfare (although, with relative performance
evaluation, workers' welfare is lower).
Secondly, in the presence of institutional constraints, relative performance
evaluation (dierently from performance-related-pay) allows to attain the
same outcome of the standard principal-agent model (with no institutional
frictions) in relation to workers' eort (expected output), market price, con-
sumer surplus and social welfare. This result is novel and is particularly
2Notice that this can hold true also for workers who are not union members, due to so-
called \extra-coverage" rules. For instance, in Italy, they operate through court ruling on
what is considered a minima or a \fair wage" (Dell'Aringa, 2002). The constitutional law
imposes a minimum wage as a worker's right and the courts take the sectorial collectively
agreed wage rates as the levels of fair wages to be paid to workers, whether or not they
are union members.
3In particular, in this case, we will adopt the principal-agent's standard hypothesis,
according to which the principal has all bargaining power and the salary is chosen so as to
strictly satisfy the agent's participation constraint (see below). This hypothesis, however,
is not essential.
3relevant, especially if we take into account the particular social purposes
that, generally, institutional arrangements, such as minimum (fair) wages,
aims at achieving.
This paper partially relates to the growing literature on managerial dele-
gation and incentive contracts in oligopolies (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman, 1985;
Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas 1987). In this context, dierent works,
starting from Fumas (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), study rela-
tive performance evaluation under diverse oligopoly settings (e.g. Miller and
Pazgal, 2002). In particular, more recently, the relative performance evalu-
ation's results have been compared with those obtained with other compen-
sation schemes (Jansen et al., 2009; Manasakis et al., forthcoming) or they
have been studied in situations in which rms delegate output decisions to
risk-adverse managers under dierent hypotheses concerning the nature of
the shocks aecting rms' performances (Asseburg and Hofmann, 2010). Our
paper, however, diers from such a literature for various reasons. Firstly, in
a strict sense, we do not consider the delegation issue since, in our frame-
work, output decisions are directly taken by rms to maximize their prots.
In doing so, however, they must take workers' eort decision into account.
Indeed, by considering the presence of agents' costly eort (which positively
aects rms' output), the issue we study is more strictly related (with re-
spect to the delegation framework) to the standard principal-agent problem,
in which the agent features as a worker instead of a manager. Secondly, to
the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the rst paper that studies relative
performance evaluation and compares it with performance-related-pay in a
duopoly framework, in which the possibility for parties to bargain over wages
is constrained by institutional arrangements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we in-
troduce the basic framework and then we show that, under the principal-
agent standard assumptions (and with workers' risk neutrality), performance-
related-pay and relative performance evaluation give the same outcomes. In
4Section 3 we introduce institutional \frictions" into the analysis and, in this
context, we derive and compare results with performance-related-pay and rel-
ative performance evaluation in relation to workers' eort, market expected
price and output and rms' expected prots. The welfare analysis is relegated
to Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Economic environment
We consider a market in which two rms fi;jg compete  a la Cournot in
production of a homogeneous good. Let assume, for simplicity, that each rm
hires and produces with one single worker and, according to the principal-
agent literature, that rms' output positively depends on eort supplied by
workers. Thus, we have a four-player game: for each of the two rms, we have
an owner (principal) and a worker (agent). Since we aim at showing that,
in the presence of institutional constraints, the incentive scheme adopted by
rms matters even if workers are risk-neutral, we consider risk neutrality for
all players and assume that the generic rm i's output, qi, is given by:
qi = ei + i (1)
where ei is the level of eort chosen by worker i (employed by rm i),
while i is a noise term, which aects output but it is not under the worker
i's control. Noise terms i are assumed to be identically and independently
distributed across rms, according to i  N(0;2
i).4
Following the standard agency theory (e.g. Hart and Holmstr om, 1987),
we consider that workers' eort is not contractible because it is not observable
by rms. However, since rms' output positively depends on eort, the
4Since we are assuming all agents' risk neutrality, noise terms play no relevant role in
this framework.
5former can be used to design an (enforceable) incentive scheme to motivate
workers. Furthermore, given that the realization of the random term is null
on average (hence expected output is equal to eort), the representative rm
i's expected prot can be written as:
i = pei   wi (2)
where wi is the (expected) wage paid by rm i to its worker (in this short-
run analysis, we exclude non-labour costs) and p is the expected market price,
which derives from the following linear product market expected demand:
p = a   cQ (3)
with Q = ei + ej.
The workers' utility is positively related to the wage and negatively to




where di > 0 is an exogenous parameter. For simplicity, we assume workers'
homogeneity (i.e. di = dj = d), hence, the worker i's expected utility function
can be formally represented as:





while we normalize to zero his/her reservation utility.
2.2 A simple standard principal-agent model
As a benchmark case for following comparisons, let consider an economic
environment in which parties can negotiate both the salary and the incentive
pay component. Following the principal-agent literature, we assume that
the principal has all the bargaining power and restrict the compensation
5This functional form for eort disutility is standard in the literature (e.g. Prendergast,
1999).
6paid to agent to be a linear function of the rm's output.6 In particular,
we compare two alternative incentive structures: performance-related-pay
(PRP), in which incentives for the worker are linked to his/her absolute
performance measure (output), and relative performance evaluation (RPE),
in which the worker's incentive pay is related to how his/her performance
is good with respect to that of the competitor (i.e. with respect to the
other rm's output). Generally, the wage contract for the worker i can be
represented as:
wi = si + bi(qi   qj) (5)
in which si is the xed salary, bi is the key-term that denes the power
of incentives provided by the contract (that is, the higher bi, the higher the
incentives), while  2 f0;1g permits to distinguish between PRP ( = 0)
and RPE ( = 1). Hence, once a rm and a worker match, the structure of
the game between themselves is as follows: in stage one, the rm optimally
design the incentive contract, linking its worker's pay to his/her (absolute or
relative) performance, and, in stage two, given the incentive contract, each







ei = argmaxei fuig
ui  0
where the two constraints represent the well-known incentive-compatibility
and participation constraints, respectively.
From Eqs. (4) and (5), the worker's expected utility can also be written
as:
6Holmstr om and Milgrom (1987) provide a rationale for the use of linear incentive
contracts in principal-agent relationships.





and the worker's i best-reply function with respect to incentives, which is






which states that the worker i's eort is higher, the higher the incentive
key-term bi provided by the rm and the lower the parameter d related to
the worker's disutility of eort.
Since the principal has all the bargaining power, and the salary compo-
nent does not aect the worker's eort, the xed term si is chosen, as usual,






  bi(qi   qj): (8)
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, by embodying in Eq. (2) the eort
chosen by the worker in the stage 2, dened by Eq. (7), and taking Eq. (8)


















From Eq. (9), notice that, by construction, the particular form of the
incentive scheme adopted does not appear. This is because by substituting
Eqs. (5) and (8) in the rm's expected prot (Eq. (2)), the term bi(qi  qj)
cancels out, hence the rm's choice about the incentive-pay form (i.e. PRP
vs. RPE) does not aect the power of incentives (bi) provided by the rm to
7In other words, the salary si simply plays the role of an \adjustment term". In
this regard, also note that it is implicitly assumed that the worker's utility function is
common-knowledge.
8its worker. Putting it other words, both incentive schemes we are considering
produce the same following results.8
Dierentiation of Eq. (9) with respect to bi yields the rst-order condition
for prot maximization by rm i, from which it is straightforward to derive





Since rms are symmetric and simultaneously choose their contract incen-
tive term to maximize their respective objective functions, hence bi = bj = b,
by simultaneously solving the resulting rst order conditions and substitut-







Substituting Eq. (11) in Eq. (7), we obtain the symmetric equilibrium






and, nally, using Eq. (12), we obtain, from Eqs. (2) and (3), the equi-









2(3c + d)2: (14)
8It is worth noting that: i) this does not depend on the hypothesis that the rm has all
the bargaining power (indeed, the same would apply if the worker receives a payo equal
to the disutility of eort plus a positive constant amount), and ii) this holds true for any
other possible incentive scheme used by rms (e.g. market-share incentive contracts).
93 Incentive contracts with institutional con-
straints
In this section, we introduce institutional considerations into the analysis. In
particular, in contrast with the principal-agent literature's standard assump-
tion, according to which the salary component is an adjustment term (which,
in principle, can be either positive or negative) that is bargained by each sin-
gle rm-worker pair, we consider the salary component of the worker's wage
as given for parties and equal for both rms (i.e. si = sj = s). As dis-
cussed in the Introduction, this could be because the salary has been dened
at an upper wage bargaining level. Indeed, as observed in many countries'
industrial relations arrangements, workers' and rms' trade-unions bargain
at upper-national wage bargaining level over the salary (which is the same
for all rms operating in the same industry), while other wage components,
which generally include incentive schemes, are dened at a lower contracting
level between each single rm and its workers (e.g. Del Boca et al., 1999). We
also assume that the salary, which has been institutionally dened at the up-
per level, is suciently high that workers always prefer to be employed than
unemployed (i.e. the salary is xed such that the participation constraint is
always satised).9
Thus, in this case, the wage contract for the worker i becomes as:
wi = s + bi(qi   qj) (15)
and the incentive problem for the rm can be formally represented as
follows:
9Formally, ui js> 0. This is a quite natural assumption, since a fundamental role
for collective bargaining at a nation-wide level is to ensure a basic wage at least high as






ei = argmaxei fuig
si = s
In what follows, analysis starts, rst, with the case of PRP.
3.1 PRP ( = 0)
With PRP, Eq. (15) becomes wi = s+biqi and the worker's i expected utility
(Eq. (4)) is:





Hence, the worker's i best-reply function with respect to incentives, which
is obtained by maximizing Eq. (16) with respect to ei, is the same as for the
standard case (as dened by Eq. (7)). Under the Cournot-Nash assumption,
by embodying in Eq. (2) the eort chosen by the worker in the stage 2 (and


















Dierentiation of Eq. (17) with respect to bi yields the rst-order con-
dition for prot maximization by rm i, from which it is straightforward to





Taking rms' symmetry into account, by simultaneously solving rst or-
der conditions and substituting, we determine the optimal contract term for













and, nally, using Eq. (20), we get, from Eqs. (2) and (3), the equilibrium









(3c + 2d)2   s: (22)
3.2 RPE ( = 1)
With RPE, Eq. (15) becomes wi = s+bi(qi qj) and the worker's i expected
utility is:





From the maximization of Eq. (23) with respect to ei, we obtain again,
as in the standard case, Eq. (7), that is, ei = bi=d.
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, by embodying in Eq. (2) the eort
chosen by the worker in the stage 2 (and taking Eq. (5) with  = 1 into


















Dierentiation of Eq. (24) with respect to bi yields the rst-order con-
dition for prot maximization by rm i, from which it is straightforward to
derive its best-reply function in contract term space as:
12bi =
ad   bj(c   d)
2(c + d)
(25)




















(3c + d)2   s: (29)
3.3 PRP versus RPE
By comparing the equilibrium market outcomes for expected output, price
and prot in the two dierent cases (with institutional constraints), we can
state the following results:
Result 1 If salaries are xed institutionally, (expected) output is always
higher and (expected) price is always lower with RPE than with PRP.10
Proof. By direct comparisons of Eq. (27) with Eq. (20) and of Eq. (28)












10Notice that, since random shocks are independent from the particular incentive scheme












(3c + d)(3c + 2d)
< 0:
Result 2 If salaries are xed institutionally, rms' (expected) prots are
always higher with RPE than with PRP.











(3c + 2d)2   s

=
3a2d(c + d)(2c + d)
(3c + d)2(3c + 2d)2 > 0:
Finally, by comparing Eq. (27) with Eq. (12), we also note that work-
ers' eort (hence, rms' expected output) with RPE (under institutional
constraints) is equal to that we get in the (standard) principal-agent model
without institutional frictions. This also implies that market price are the
same for those cases.11
Result 3 If salaries are xed institutionally and rms use RPE incentive
schemes, (expected) output and market price are the same as in the standard
principal-agent framework without institutional constraints.
Proof. Simple comparisons between Eqs. (27) and (28) with Eqs. (12) and
(13) conrm that QRPE = 2eRPE = 2ePA = QPA and pRPE = pPA.
11Obviously, prots could be lower with RPE and institutional constraints than in the
standard principal-agent case. In particular, under the assumption that the workers'
participation constraint is binding, rms' prots are lower in the presence of institutional
constraints if, as most likely, they ensure a salary to workers larger than their opportunity




In order to compare expected consumer surplus and social welfare for dierent






SW = CS + 2pe   de
2: (31)
Hence, by using Eqs. (20) and (21), we have that, in the PRP case, the




(3c + 2d)2 (32)




(3c + 2d)2 +
2a2(c + 2d)
(3c + 2d)2  
a2d
(3c + 2d)2 =
a2(4c + 3d)
(3c + 2d)2 : (33)








(3c + d)2 +
2a2(c + d)
(3c + d)2  
a2d
(3c + d)2 =
a2(4c + d)
(3c + d)2 : (35)
By comparing previous results, we can state:
Result 4 If salaries are xed institutionally, expected consumer surplus and
social welfare are always higher with RPE than with PRP.





(3c + d)2  
2a2c
(3c + 2d)2 =
6a2cd(2c + d)
(3c + d)2(3c + 2d)2 > 0:





(3c + d)2  
a2(4c + 3d)
(3c + 2d)2 =
a2d(6c2 + 6cd + d2)
(3c + d)2(3c + 2d)2 > 0:
Finally, since, as shown above, we have that eRPE = ePA and pRPE = pPA,
we can also arm the following result:
Result 5 When salaries are xed institutionally and rms use RPE to moti-
vate their workers, expected consumer surplus and social welfare are the same
as in the standard principal-agent framework without institutional frictions,
in which rms \freely" choose all pay components.
Before concluding, it is worth making some further comments about pre-
vious results. Indeed, since they hinge largely on the equilibrium values of the
incentive key-term b (which determines the equilibrium workers' eort), for
the dierent cases we have analyzed, this is the point that deserves some ma-
jor considerations. In this regard, for a better understanding of the rationale
behind our results, we may refer to Eqs. (9), (17) and (24), which dene rm's
expected prot for the three cases: the standard principal-agent framework
(in which, recall, PRP and RPE are equivalent) and the \institutionally-
dependant" cases with PRP and RPE, respectively. If we dierentiate those
equations with respect to bi, we get the marginal eect of the incentive term































16In relation to the rst term of the r.h.s. of Eqs. (36), (37) and (38),
which represents the marginal eect of bi on rm i's expected revenue, two
things are worth noting: i) it is decreasing in bi, and ii) it is exactly the
same (and for the same reasons) in all the three cases.12 Hence, dierences
in equilibrium bi's values must be look for in the second term of the r.h.s.,
which captures the marginal eect of bi on wages.
With reference to this latter eect, which is always positive (hence, neg-
ative with respect to prot), rstly, we must take into account that it op-
erates dierently in the principal-agent standard framework with respect to
the cases with institutional constraints. Indeed, in the former, an increase
in bi increases the wage only indirectly, because it rst produces an increase
in worker's eort, hence in worker's disutility. Since in the principal-agent
framework wages are xed so as to equalize workers' disutility from eort, this
determines, at the end, also an increase in wages. Recalling that ei = bi=d,
the marginal eect of an increase of bi on worker i's wage can be formally
















Instead, in the presence of institutionally xed salaries (ensuring a priori
that workers' participation constraints are satised) the mechanism through
which an increase in bi translates in a higher wage is very dierent, since,
given the salary, it directly operates via an increase in the incentive-pay

















12An increase in bi, by increasing worker i's eort (hence, output) has both a positive
and a negative eect on rm i's revenue, the latter due to decreasing market price. Also
note that, even if rm i's does not use relative performance evaluation, incentives provided
by the other rm (bj) produce a (negative) externality for rm i (thus, aecting its own
choice about bi) due to the eect on overall market output and price that they produce.




















Clearly, by comparing Eqs. (39), (40) and (41), and reminding that
marginal revenue with respect to bi (equal for the three cases) is decreasing
in bi, we get that, when there are institutional constraints, the equilibrium
incentive key-term (hence, eort) with RPE is greater than with PRP. Fur-
thermore, incentives and eort with RPE in the presence of institutional
arrangements are the same than in the standard principal-agent framework
(without institutional frictions), even if the underlying mechanisms that pro-
duce such results are very dierent.13 These results drive the following ones
on expected output, market price, consumer surplus and social welfare.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied equilibrium incentive contracts in a Cournot
duopoly where rms are constrained by institutional arrangements (e.g. ow-
ing to a centralised monopolistic union or a legal minimum wage) to pay a
given salary. Even though our model is specic, it points out that, if some
\frictions" in the xing process of the salary do exist, the particular incen-
tive scheme adopted by rms matters. In particular, we have compared two
alternative incentive schemes, namely PRP and RPE, and we have shown
that they dierently aect market and social outcomes, even if workers are
13Indeed, by comparing Eqs. (39) and (41), it clearly emerges that, while they are gen-
erally dierent, hence they imply dierent worker's eort levels (the same appears, more
directly, also by comparing reaction functions dened by Eqs. (10) and (25)), in equilib-
rium, they become equal due to the symmetry hypothesis. Admitting for some asymme-
tries, with RPE, workers' eort might be also higher in the \institutionally-dependant"
case than in the standard principal-agent framework. The analysis of an \asymmetric"
context is beyond the scope of this work and is left for future research.
18risk-neutral. This result contrasts with the standard principal-agent litera-
ture, according to which, with risk-neutral agents, PRP and RPE produce
the same results.
More in detail, we have found that output, prots, consumer surplus and
social welfare are higher with RPE than with PRP. By contrast, workers'
utility is lower with RPE. This is because, with RPE, worker's eort and,
as a consequence, disutility are higher with respect to PRP, the incentive-
pay component is lower (null, in equilibrium), while the salary is the same,
because it is xed institutionally.
Furthermore, in the RPE case, the same outcomes of the standard principal-
agent model, in which all pay components are \freely" chosen, are achieved
with reference to eort (expected output), market price, consumer surplus
and social welfare. Putting it other words, the \eciency" of the standard
principal-agent model also is preserved under institutional constraints, when
rms adopt the proper incentive scheme. Obviously, in this case, dierences
could exist concerning the distribution of the surplus. In particular, we might
expect that prots will be generally lower (and, conversely, workers' utility
higher) with institutional constraints and RPE than in the standard case.
Finally, it is worth mentioning some potential ways of extending this pa-
per, which represent the directions of our research. In particular, it would be
interesting to consider other possible incentive schemes (e.g. market share
related pay) and to extend previous analysis to other market competitive set-
tings, such as dierentiated oligopoly or price competition, or by introducing
asymmetries in relation to both workers and rms.
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